Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Downey State Bank v. Major Blakeney Corporation
: Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
George D. Melling, Scott H. Clark; Fabian & Clendenin; Attorneys for Respondent.
Carl J. Nemelka; Nemelka & Nemelka; Don R. Strong; C. Keith Rooker; Martineau & Maak;
Attorneys for Defendants .
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Downey State Bank v. Major Blakeney Corporation, No. 914546.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3831

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

u : AM
DOCsJML.Nu"
KFU

UTAH SUPREME COURT

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY

BRIEF

45.9
.S9
DOCKET NO.

•REMS COUkT
i«tTE OF UTAH
BRIGHT VOUHC UKIYERSITY

J. Reuben C

Schoot

DOWNEY STATE BANK,
Plaintiff-Respondentj

v.
MAJOR-BLAKENEY
et al.,

CORPORATION,

Defendants.
JOSEPH L. KROFCHECK,

Case No,

14546

Defendant-Appellant,
and

FILED

FRANKLIN D, RICHARDS & C O . ,
a n d RICHARD W. RINGWOOD,

AUG 3 - 1 9 7 6

Interveners.

Cbrk, Supreme Court, Utah

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF TEE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF CTT.AH
THE HONORAELE STEWART M. HANSON, S R . ,

^ENIOR JUDGE PRESIDING

FAPIAN & CLENDENIN
G e o r g e D« M a i l i n g , S c o t t H . C l a r k
Attorneys for Respondent
300 C o n t i n e n t a l Bank B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101

DON R.| STRONG
Attorney for Appellant
197 Sduth Main Street
Springlville, Utah 84663

NEMEL.KA ft NEMELKA
C a r l J , Nerueika

MASTINtEAU & MAAK
C. KeiJth Rooker
Attorneys for the Intervenes
Franklin D. Richards & Co.
180 0 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
c t * 1it r ake City, Utah 34111

Attorneys for the Intervenor
Richard W* Ringwood
Suite 20 7:
610 East Scuch Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

IN THE SUPREME COU^T
OF THE STATE OF UT&H
DOWNEY STATE BANK,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MAJOR-BLAKENEY CORPORATION,
et al.,
Defendants•
Case No. 14546

JOSEPH L. KROFCHECK,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
FRANKLIN D. RICHARDS & CO.,
and RICHARD W. RINGWOOD,
Intervenors.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE STEWART M. HANSON, SR. , SENIOR JUDGE PRESIDING

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
George D. Melling, Scott H. Clark
Attorneys for Respondent
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

DON R. STRONG
Attorney for Appellant
197 South Main Street
Springville, Utah 84663

NEMELKA & NEMELKA
Carl J. Nemelka
Attorneys for the Intervenor
Richard W. Ringwood
Suite 202
610 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

MARTI^EAU & MAAK
C. Keith Rooker
Attorneys for the Intervenor
Franklin D. Richards & Co»
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

6

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

7

STATEMENT OF FACTS

7

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

10

ARGUMENT

11

I.

II.

III.

DOWNEY STATE BANK WAS ENTITLED TO BE
REIMBURSED FOR THE ATTORNEYS' FEES IT
INCURRED AS THE RESULT OF KROFCHECK'S
UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO SET ASIDE THE
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE AND HIS SUBSEQUENT
APPEAL

11

THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ACTED
WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION IN CHARGING
DOWNEY'S ADDITIONAL ATTORNEYS* FEES
AGAINST THE SURPLUS FUNDS FROM THE
FORECLOSURE SALE

18

AS MORTGAGEE, DOWNEY STATE BANK'S CLAIMS
AGAINST THE SURPLUS ARE SUPERIOR TO THOSE
OF KROFCHECK AS A "NONASSUMING GRANTEE". . . .

22

CONCLUSION

25

Appendix "A" - Decision of this Court in Downey State
Bank v. Major—Blakeney Corp., et al. (FIRST
APPEAL)

27

Appendix "B" - Order of the Honorable Stewart M.
Hanson, Sr.

31

-2-

CASES CITED

?a9e
Alabama City, G & A Ry. Co. v. Kyle,
204 Ala. 597, 87 So. 191 (1920). .

13

Alexander v. Groves, 345 F.Supp. 848
(D. Maryland, 1972)

13, 15, 16

Anderson v. Hiatt, 181 Cal.App.2d 9,
4 Cal.Rptr. 858 (1960)

14

Application of Fernan Lake Village,
80 Idaho 412, 331 P.2d 278 (1958)

25

Automatic Vending Co. v. Wisdom, 182 Cal.App.2d
354, 6 Cal.Rptr. 31 (1960)
..,..,

14

Beckman v. Skaggs, 61 Cal. 362 (1882)
14, 15
Breven Carpets Corp. v. Davis, 210 Cal.App.2d
206, 26 Cal.Rptr. 513 (1962)
14
Cabot v. First National Bank of Santa Fe,
81 N.M. 795, 474 P.2d 478 (1970)
• • n

14,

Cirimele v. Shinazy, 134 Cal.App.2d 50,
285 P.2d 311 (1955)

14,

15, 16
15, 21

Corinthian Corp. v. White & Ballard;, Inc. J
74 Wash.Dec.2d 49, 442 P.2d 950 (1968)
15
Dankert v. Lamb Finance Co., 146 Cal.App.2d 499,
304 P.2d 199 (1957). .
14
Douglas v. Vancouver Plywood Co., 16 Ariz.App.
364, 493 P.2d 531 (1972)
.
13
Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., et al.,
545 P.2d 507 (Utah, 1976). . . . . . . . . . .

9,
10, 12

Empress Homes, Inc. v. Levin, 201 So.2d 475
(Fla.App., 1967) . . . . .
.
Erbe Corp. v. W & B Realty Co., Inc.,
255 Cal.App.2d 773, 63 Cal.Rptr. 462 (1967). . .

14, 15
14

F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah2d
80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965)
. ..
20

Pag
F. S. Jones Const. Co. v. Duncan Crane & Rigging,
Inc., 2 Wash.App. 509, 468 P.2d 699 (1970)
Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 384 F.2d 365
(5th Cir. , 1967)

15, 22
13, 15, 21

Gustafson v. State, 11 Ariz.App. 176, 462 P.2d
869 (1969)

14, 21

Hahn v. Hahn, 123 Cal.App.2d 97, 266 P.2d 519
(1954)

14, 15, 16

Hales v. Snowden, 40 Cal.App.2d 801, 105 P.2d
1015 (1940)

15, 16

In re Deseret Mortuary Co., 78 Utah 393,
3 P.2d 267 (1931)

25

Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 145 P.
1036 (1915)

23

Kurtz v. Ogden Canyon Sanitarium Co.,
37 Utah 313, 108 P. 14 (1910)

20

Lawrence Block Co., Inc. v. England, 211 Cal.App.2d
318, 27 Cal.Rptr. 362 (1963)

14

Marks v. Culmer, 7 Utah 163, 25 P. 743 (1891)

13

Martindell v. Bodrero, 256 Cal.App.2d 56,
63 Cal.Rptr. 774 (1967)
New England Merchants Nat. Bank of Boston v. Hoss,
356 Mass. 331, 249 N.E.2d 635 (1969)
Oatis v. Decluze, 226 La. 751, 77 So.2d 28 (1954) . . .
Puget Sound Mutual Savings Bank v. Lillions,
50 Wash.2d 799, 314 P.2d 935 (1957)

14
14, 22
14

15, 16, 20

Rabinowitch v. California Western Gas Co.,
257 Cal.App.2d 150, 65 Cal.Rptr. 1 (1968)

14

Ranta v. German, 1 Wash.App. 104, 459 P.2d 961
(1969)

15

Scherwin v. Shoslak, 213 Cal.App.2d 37,
28 Cal.Rptr. 332 (1963)

14

Pag
Shoup v. Mayerson, 454 P.2d 666 (Okla., 1969)

14

Steele v. Vanderslice, 90 Ariz. 277, 367 P.2d 636
(1961)

13, 15

Stockton Theatres v. Palermo, 124 Cal.App.2d 353,
268 P.2d 799 (1954)

14

Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate & Investment Co.,
3 Utah2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955)

12

T. M. Strider v. Western Casualty & Surety Co.,
10 So. 2d 350 (Miss., 1942)

14

Vaughn v. Vaughn, 91 Idaho 544, 428 P.2d 50 (1967).

14, 16

Washington Trust Co. v. Fatone, 106 R.I. 168,
256 A.2d 490 (1969)
Wiese v. Steinauer, 201 Cal.App.2d 651,

15, 16

20 Cal.Rptr. 295 (1962)

14, 21

Wilson v. Wilson, 54 Cal.2d 264, 352 P.2d 725 (1960).

. 14

Zambruk v. Perlmutter 3rd Generation Builders, Inc.,
32 Colo.App. 276, 510 P.2d 472 (1973) . . . . .

14, 22

TEXTS CITED
3 Powzll

on Rza.1 Ptiopz/ity,

Section 46 7

24

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated § 34-27-1
Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-4
Utah Code Annotated §78-37-9

13
18
12

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UT^H
DOWNEY STATE BANK,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MAJOR-BLAKENEY CORPORATION,
et al.,
Defendants,
JOSEPH L. KROFCHECK,

Case No. 14546

Defendant-Appellant,
and
FRANKLIN D. RICHARDS & CO. ,
and RICHARD W. RINGWOOD,
Interveners.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT!

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Joseph L. Krofcheck, appeals from an
order of the Third Judicial District Court of Suittmit County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. presiding,
entered March 17, 1976 amending the Judgment and Decree of
Foreclosure of March 4, 1974 and awarding to the Respondent,
from surplus funds on deposit with the Coi^rt, additional
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attorneys1 fees incurred in resisting proceedings initiated by
the Appellant (including an unsuccessful appeal) in an attempt
to vacate the said Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent respectfully submits to this Court that the
Order of the Third Judicial District Court amending the Judgment
and Decree of Foreclosure of March 4, 1974 should be sustained,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In October, 1973, Downey State Bank of Downey, Idaho
commenced this action to foreclose two mortgages on five unreleased parcels of land in Summit County near the ill-fated Park
City West ski resort for the purpose of recovering the principal
($26,800*00) and interest ($5,097*09) owing on two mortgages
given by Major-Blakeney Corporation which had fallen into default in May of 1971,

Downey State Bank soon discovered that

Major-Blakeney Corporation had ceased doing business in Utah in
1969 and that its interest in the five parcels, had in the
interim, been transferred to William S, Richards and had ultimately come to rest in "Joseph L. Krofcheck, trustee" as an
apparent nonassuming grantee (a California psychiatrist, the
nature of whose trusteeship and the identities of whose beneficiaries are as yet unknown to Respondent)•
A Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure was entered on
March 4, 1974. On April 9, 1974, Deputy Sheriff Leon Wilde
conducted a sale of the five parcels of land, four of which
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were sold to the Intervenor, Franklin Dt Richarda & Co,, and
one of which was sold to the Intervenor Richard Ringwood.
After satisfaction of the costs of sale and the judgment of
the Respondent, the sum of $9,655,58

was deposited with the

court and notice of the deposit was sent by Downey to all of
the named defendants.
On October 2, 1974, the Appellant/ Joseph L. Krofcheck,
by his attorney, in an ex p<vt£z proceeding/ moved to vacate the
decree of foreclosure, to stay the proceedings, and to extend
the redemption period for an additional six months.

[R. 69].

(The motion was dated September 11, 1974, but was not filed
until seven days prior to the expiration of the first redemption period.)

On October 2, 1974, Judge Bullock extended the

redemption period as prayed by the Appellant Krofcheck.

There-

after, the purchasers at the foreclosure sale, Franklin D.
Richards & Co. and Richard Ringwood, filed motions for leave
to intervene and there followed a series of motions initiated
by the Intervenors and by the Respondent, Downey State Bank,
and opposed by the Appellant, Krofcheck, ^s both sides wrestled
over the merit (or lack thereof), of the extended redemption
period and the Krofcheck motion to vacate the Judgment and
Decree of Foreclosure.

This struggle in the Fourth Judicial

District Court eventually drew the attention of Judge Allen B.
Sorensen and of Judge George E. Ballif as well as of Judge
J. Robert Bullock and hearings were had in both Coalville and
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in Provo, generating a flurry of memoranda of "points and
authorities" from all sides*
Finally, on February 26, 1975, Judge Allen B. Sorensen
denied the Krofcheck motion to vacate the decree of foreclosure,
and on March 7, 1975, Judge J. Robert Bullock vacated his previous order extending the redemption period*

From Judge

Sorensenfs ruling, Krofcheck appealed, which appeal involved
yet another round of preliminary motions surrounding Krofcheck's
attempt to supplement the record on appeal with two affidavits
not presented to the court below.

Upon this Court's denial of

the Krofcheck motion to supplement the record on appeal, briefs
were filed and oral argument was heard, culminating in the
unanimous decision of this Court affirming the rulings and
orders of Judges Sorensen and Bullock in Voumzy Statz
Majoi-Blakznzif
1976*

Coip.,

zt

Bank

v.

aJL., 545 P.2d 507 filed January 26,

The case was remitted to the Third Judicial District

Court on February 26, 1976 whence ensued the proceedings from
which Krofcheck now appeals.!./

(See "Disposition in the Lower

Court."

1/A1SO in April of 1976, after the Respondent Downey
refused to restore Krofcheck to his former rights, Krofcheck
filed yet another lawsuit against the Sheriff of Summit County,
Downey State Bank, and Downey's counsel alleging fraud on this
Court and seeking to vacate the Judgment and Decree of
Foreclosure of March 4, 1974 and other relief.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

After the entry of this Court's decision in the
Appellant's first Appeal, Vownztf Statu
Co*p.,

tt

al.p

B«infc v.

Majoi-BlakzyiZLf

545 P.2d 507 (1976) [See Appendix "A"], wherein

this Court unanimously upheld the refusal of the Fourth Judicial District Court to vacate the Judgment and Decree of
Foreclosure entered March 4, 1974, this case was remitted
February 26, 19 76 to the Court of the Third Judicial District
of Summit County,

Downey State Bank thei| moved the lower

court to amend the original Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure
to award unto Downey the sum of the attorneys1 fees incurred
and paid by Downey in resisting the Appellant's attempts to
vacate the original judgment, including the Krofcheck appeal.
Notice of the hearing on the Downey motion was given both by
Downey and by the Clerk of the Court to all of the named
defendants in the proceeding.

At the hearing held on March 15,

1976 only counsel for Downey appeared although counsel for the
Appellant sent a memorandum in opposition to Downey's motion
to the court (a copy of which was furnished to counsel for
Downey by the court at the hearing).

Upon consideration of

argument advanced by counsel for Downey and upon receipt of
testimony concerning the hours spent, the documents prepared,
the appearances made, and the value of suph legal services

-10-

rendered on behalf of Downey and paid by Downey since March 4,
1974, the court granted the Downey motion.

The order now

appealed from by Krofcheck was entered on March 17, 1976
[Appendix "B"], with the result that Downey was paid the sum
of these additional attorneys! fees from the surplus funds
on deposit with the Court.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

I.

DOWNEY STATE BANK WAS ENTITLED TO BE REIMBURSED
FOR THE ATTORNEYS1 FEES IT INCURRED AS THE RESULT OF KROFCHECK'S UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO
SET ASIDE THE DECREE OF FORECLOSURE AND HIS
SUBSEQUENT APPEAL.

The two real estate mortgages which were foreclosed by
the Fourth Judicial District Court in previous proceedings in
this case each provided as follows:
If because of default this mortgage and note for
which the same is given as security is given to an
attorney for collection, Mortgagor [Major-Blakeney
Corp., the grantor of Krofcheck's grantor] agrees
to pay a reasonable attorney's fee together with
all costs incurred.
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Each of the Promissory Notes which were secured by the said
mortgages which provided as follows:
If action be instituted herein for collection, the
undersigned [Major-Blakeney Corp.] promises to pay
such sum as the court may fix as reasonable attorney's
fees.
The Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure entered by the
Fourth Judicial District Court on March 4, 1974 gave judgment
to Downey State Bank for the "sum now due and owing to plaintifffl including interest and attorneys1 fees incurred through
that date. Neither the court nor Downey State Bank could have
then foreseen the extensive proceedings initiated by Krofcheck
on October 4, 1974 when he moved to vacate the decree of foreclosure , which proceedings ultimately culminated in Krofcheckfs
unsuccessful appeal to this Court.
Majosi-Blakznzy

CoKp.,

tt

al.,

Vown&y State.

Bank

v.

545 P.2d 507 (Utah, 1976)

decision by Justice Crockett [Appendix AT.
Krofcheck now presses upon this Court the artificial
hypothesis that because the judgment did not contain the
magical incantation "plus any additional attorneys1 fees
incurred on appeal," or something to that effect, that Downey
is now barred from its contractual and statutory right to
recover from the excess funds received at the sale of the
property the additional damages inflicted upon Downey by the
Krofcheck attacks.

Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-9.

Krofcheck completely overlooks Swatn v. Salt
E&tatz

& lnve.Atme.nt

Co.,

Lakz R&al

3 Utah2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955),
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which decision plainly repudiates the Krofcheck hypothesis.
Although Swain

did not involve a mortgage foreclosure and

extensive (and unsuccessful) attempts by a nonassuming grantee
to set aside the foreclosure decree, Chief Justice McDonough
was clearly of the opinion that where a contract provides for
an award of attorneys1 fees in the event of a lawsuit, and
where the party claiming such fees prevails on appeal, this
Court may award additional attorneys' fees incurred on
appeal.
Contrary to the impression conveyed to this Court by
the Appellantfs brief on appeal, the vast weight of authority
is to the effect that a Respondent who successfully resists
attacks made upon a prior judgment in the Respondent's favor,
is also entitled (if the contract provides for the payment of
attorneys' fees) to be reimbursed for the attorneys' fees
incurred in its own defense, including attorneys' fees incurred on appeal.
(5th Cir. 1967).

land, 1972).

Freeman v. Continental
klzxandzK

Alabama City,

v. Glov&A,

384 F.2d 365

345 F.Supp. 848 (D. Mary-

G. 6 k. Ry. Co. v. Kylz,

597, 87 So. 191 (1920). Stttlz
367 P.2d 636 (1961).

Gin Co.,

v. Vandztellcz,

VomqlaA v.

Vancouvz/i

204 Ala.

90 Ariz. 277,

Plywood

Co.,

16 Ariz.

2/Krofcheck's reliance upon Ma&k6 v. CixlmzK, 7 Utah 163,
25 P. 743 (1891) is misplaced. Matik* v. CmlmzK merely holds
that absent some specific legislative authorization (such as
Utah Code Annotated § 34-27-1 where attorneys' fees in wage
claims may be taxed as "costs"), attorneys' fees are not taxed
as "costs" on appeal. Downey makes no claim that it is entitled
to such attorneys' fees as part of its "costs" on appeal.
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356 Mass.
Casualty
Fir*t

Hat.

Shoup v.

Mayesuon,

fatone,

454 P.2d 666 (Okla., 1969).

Washington

106 R.I. 168, 256 A.2d 490 (1969).

v. White 6 Ballard,
Paget

(1968).

Inc.,

Savings

Wash.2d 799, 314 P.2d 935 (1957).

Corinthian
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Inc.,

Bank v.
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F. S. Jones Const.

Co. v.

2 Wash.App. 509, 468 P.2d 699

Ranta v. German, 1 Wash.App. 104, 459 P.2d 961 (1969).

(1970).

Of the foregoing cases, Hahn v. Hahn,
Mutual

Co. v.

74 Wash.Dec.2d 49, 442 P.2d 950

Sound Mutual

Duncan Crane S Rigging,

Tsuut

Saving*

Bank v.

Empress Homes, Inc.

Lllllons,

v. Levin,

Steele

v.

Vuget

Sound

Vandersllce,

and Beckman v« Skaggs all in-

volved mortgage foreclosures where the mortgagee-respondents
were awarded additional attorneys1 fees incurred on appeal.
The above-cited decisions in Alexander
First

Hatlonal

Bank o£ Santa

F'atone, Freeman v. Continental

v. Groves,

Fe, Workington
Gin Co.,

Trust

Cabot
Co.

and Clrlmele

v.
v.

v.

Sklnazy

are substantially, if not completely devoted to the issue of
the award of additional attorneys1 fees incurred on appeal to
parties successful on appeal. In a footnote to Freeman v.
Continental

Gin Co., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals notes

the case of Hale* v. Snowden,

40 Cal.App.2d 801, 105 P.2d 1015

(1940), relied upon by Krofcheck^[Appellant's Brief p. 5] and
remarks that Hale* v. Snowden is not California law, which

2/Appellant cites 59 C.J.S. "Mortgage*" § 812 at p.
1551, footnote number 75, which is actually a quotation from
the headnote of Holer

v.

Snowden.
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conclusion was probably based upon the wealth of California
cases which adopt the majority rule.

In Cabot v. fitut

384 F.2d 365, at 366.

Hat. Eank oh Santa Fe, the Supreme

Court of New Mexico repudiated the Krofcheck theory (Halt*

v.

Snowd&n) when it noted:
As a general rule, the cause of action does merge into
the judgment, but the incident of the debt may be
carried forward to prevent the inequitable destruction
of a contract right.
474 P.2d 478 at 480.

In Pugzt Sound Mutual Saving*

Sank v. Lllllon*,

the

Supreme Court of Washington construed language providing
for the award of attorneys1 fees in the event of a default
which is substantially the same as that contained in the
Major-Blakeney mortgages.

The court declared:

When a note and mortgage contain contractual
provisions such as we are considering, we believe
they indicate that the parties contemplated that the
mortgagee would be entitled to the allowance of a
reasonable attorneyfs fee for all legal services
required to prosecute the foreclosure to its ultimate
conclusion, should foreclosure be necessary. This
would include the right to a fee for the defense or
prosecution of an appeal to this court. Such a fee
is as much a part of the obligation of the contract
as any other part.
314 P.2d 935 at 940. And in Hakn v. Hakn (which also involved a mortgage foreclosure) , the District Court of
Appeals of California construed language similar to that
contained in the Major-Blakeney promissory notes, noting:
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The note provides that if action be instituted
thereon, defendant promises to pay such sum as the
court may fix as attorney's fees for services to the
time it was entered. Plaintiff says he should be allowed additional attorney's fees for defendant against
the appeal. The purpose of a provision for attorney's
fees in a promissory note is to indemnify the creditor
against the necessity of paying attorney's fee (citation omitted) and to enable him to recover the full
amount of his debt without deduction for legal
expenses. [Emphasis added]
266 P.2d 519 at 523.

The justification for such a holding is

clear:
the purpose of a provision requiring a debtor to reimburse the creditor for the expense of counsel fees
reasonably incurred in enforcing the obligation on
default is to insure the creditor that he will not
lose the~benefit of his bargain because of the debtor's
default"! When the parties enter into such a contract,
they contemplate that when the debt matures, the creditor will receive what he bargained for undiminished by
the expenses which he was forced to incur by the debtor's
default. It is immaterial whether these expenses were
incurred in a trial court or in appellate proceedings,
(citation omitted) [emphasis added].
Washington

Titat

Co. v.

Fatonz,

256 A.2d 490 at 494. This

position was adopted by the Supreme Court of Idaho in Vaughn v.
Vaughn when it characterized the rule as that of "the more
recent and in our opinion the better reasoned cases."
P.2d 50 at 54.
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II.

THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ACTED WITHIN
ITS JURISDICTION IN CHARGING DOWNEY'S ADDITIONAL
ATTORNEYS1 FEES AGAINST THE SURPLUS FUNDS FROM
THE FORECLOSURE SALE.

The corollary argument advanced py Krofcheck is that

I

on remittur, the Third Judicial District Court had no 3unsdiction to amend the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure of
March 4, 1974.1/
Krofcheckfs argument overlooks the critical fact that
the Third Judicial District Court had jurisdiction over the
fund on deposit with that court with a responsibility to "cause
the same to be paid to the person entitled to it . . • ."
Code Annotated § 78-37-4.

Utah

Krofcheck also ignores the fact that

in the first appeal, that party who should have been most interested in the disposition of the surplus funds received from
the foreclosure sale (from which funds Downeyfs claim for additional attorneys1 fees had to be satisfied —

since Krofcheck

4/The Order now appealed from by Krofcheck was entered
by Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. with retroactive effect, i.e.
nunc ptio tunc, to avoid the claim that byt amending the decree
of foreclosure, a new six month redemption period would begin
to run. The Respondent's caution in attempting to avoid such
a claim was born of its experience with the previous appeal
and with several other appeals prosecuted by the Appellant on
related cases involving neighboring landg*
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is an apparent nonassuming grantee), i.e. Richards & Richards,
was not represented before this Court. Nor did this Court have
any evidence before it concerning the proper disposition of
such surplus.

Nor had this Court any evidence before it from

which it could reasonably assess the sum of the attorneysf fees
actually incurred and paid by Downey since March 4, 1974, nor
indeed could such fees have been determined until the appeal
itself was resolved.

Under such circumstances, Downey submits

that it was appropriate for Downey to have submitted its motion
to amend the original judgment and decree of foreclosure to the
trial court where, only after due notice to all of the codefendants including lien claimants,6/and upon the receipt by
the trial court of the undisputed testimony of counsel for
Downey concerning the actual attorneys1 fees incurred by Downey
as a result of the Krofcheck motions and unsuccessful appeal,
the order now complained of was entered.

In view of this

Court's decisions requiring that an award of attorneys1 fees

5/The record reveals that Richards & Richards claims an
attorneys1 lien against the property by virtue of a Notice of
Lien dated November 14, 1972 and recorded November 15, 1972.
So much of this lien as encumbered parcel 12 of the property
was assigned to the Intervenor in this case, Franklin D. Richards & Co. on September 26, 1974 and according to an affidavit
filed by the successor to Richards & Richards, dated July 5,
1976, the lien was as yet unsatisfied.
6/The record reveals that notice of Downey's proposed
Motion to Amend Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure was given
not only to all of the co-defendants by Downey, but that notice
of the hearing on the motion was given to all parties by the
clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of Summit County, at
which hearing only counsel for Downey appeared.
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by a lower court in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding be supported by evidence of reasonableness, including the proffer
of testimony if necessary, it is respectfully suggested that
the most reasonable and appropriate procedure under the circumstances was adopted by the Third Judicial District Court.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-9.
v. Build,

Inc.,

C.f. F.M.A. financial

17 Utah2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965).

Ogdtn Canyon Sanitarium

Co.,

Coip.
KuJtfz

v.

37 Utah 313, 108 P. 14 (1910).

Such a motion to amend the original Judgment and
Decree of Foreclosure was in the nature of a supplemental
petition and the jurisdiction of a trial court to entertain
such a petition after an appeal under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure was extensively considered in Ale.xande.fi y.
G/iov&A, 345 F.Supp. 848 (D. Maryland, 1972).

In concluding

that it was proper for a party which was successful on appeal
to return to the trial court and there to present evidence
concerning attorneys1 fees incurred on appeal, the AZe.xande.si
court relies in part upon the decision of the Supreme Court
of Washington in Pugzt

Sound Mutual

50 Wash.2d 799, 314 P#2d 935 (1957).

Saving*

Bank v.

In Vugtt

Sound,

Lllllon^,
after the

defendant-appellant had perfected its appeal, the plaintiffrespondent filed a motion in the lower court for a determination and allowance of attorneys1 fees incurred on appeal.
The lower court denied the motion on the ground that when
the appeal had been perfected, it had lost further jurisdiction
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over the case —

at least until the case was remitted*

Upon

the filing of a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the
lower court to hear the plaintiff-respondent's motion for
attorneys' fees on appeal

the Washington Supreme Court determined

that any decision on the attorneys' fees on appeal should await
the court's consideration of the appeal on its merits.
after upholding the judgment of the lower court, the
Sound

But

Pugzt

court held that the filing of the petition before the

appeal had been heard was premature, and the court remanded
the matter to the trial court for a determination and award of
the attorneys' fees incurred on appeal*

314 P.2d 935 at

940-941.

And in F/tzzman v. Contlnzntal

Gin Co., 384 F.2d 365 at

366 (1967), the Fifth Circuit said that:
In allowing additional fees for legal services on appeal
in statutory actions, this Court has sometimes fixed the
amount thereof* (Citations omitted). More recently it
has said that this "should be determined in the first
instance by the district court." (Citations omitted).
whereupon the case was remanded to the lower court for a determination of the fees incurred on appeal.
adopted in the following cases:
App. 176, 462 P.2d 869 (1969).

GuAtafaon
Wzitz

App.2d 651, 20 Cal.Rptr. 295 (1962).

This procedure was
v. Statu,

11 Ariz.

v. SttlnamtK,

201 Cal.

ClKlmzld

Sklnazy,1/

v.

Citiimzlt
v. Sklnazy,
the California Court of Appeals
heard two appeals, and after remand of the first appeal and the
trial court's failure to award unto the plaintiff its attorneys'
fees on the first appeal, the Court of Appeals amended the judgment on the second appeal and awarded attorneys' fees incurred
on both appeals.
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134 C a l . A p p . 2 d 5 0 , 285 P . 2 d 311 ( 1 9 5 5 ) .
S/id Generation
(1973).

Bmltdc/U,

Mcu) England

Inc.,

ttctickant*

& Rigging,

?lAlmtUtzti

32 Colo.A^p. 2 7 6 , 510 P . 2 d 472
Hat.

Bank c£ Boston

356 Mass. 3 3 1 , 249 N . E . 2 d 635 ( 1 9 6 0 ) .
v. Duncan Cianc

I Zamb/iuk v.

Inc.,

F« S. Jonte

v.

tfc44,

Con*t.

Co.

2 Wash.App. 5 0 9 , 468 P . 2 d 699

(1970).

III.

AS MORTGAGEE, DOWNEY STATE BANK'S CLAIMS AGAINST
THE SURPLUS FUNDS ARE SUPERIOR TQ THOSE OP
KROFCHECK AS A "NONASSUMING GRANtEE."

In his brief on appeal [pp. 7 and 8] Krofcheck confuses
the issue by seeming to imply that Downey received a judgment
of personal liability against Krofcheck, thereby claiming
that the surplus fund on deposit with the court was indisputably his own, free of any claims advanced by Downey or by
anyone else.

Then in a lapse of logic, I^rofcheck contradicts

himself in admitting that "Respondent's claims involve fees
and costs attributable to the Appellant Krofcheck, who cannot
be held liable therefor . . . ."

[Appellant's Brief, page 7].

The evidence adduced below does not demonstrate that
Krofcheck is in fact a nonassuming grantee.

But Krofcheck's

status as a "nonassuming grantee11 is quitje beside the point.
Such a status does not entitle him to ridhts in the xc*

(or

in the surplus fund) superior to "those of the original mortgagor,
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Major-Blakeney Corp* Downey is not attempting to enforce a
deficiency judgment against Krofcheck.

(Downey State Bank did

not obtain personal service of process on Mr* Krofcheck and as
a result, Downey would be barred in any event from claiming a
deficiency against Krofcheck.)

Krofcheckfs brief on appeal

notwithstanding, Downey has not proceeded <Ln pzsuonam
a deficiency judgment against Krofcheck.

to obtain

Downey has proceeded

in equity against the >KL& , claiming as the mortgagee that it
was entitled to "be made whole" by deducting from the surplus
fund the sum of its additional attorneys1 fees.

It is Downey's

contention that such funds represented a transmutation of the
original security and that Krofcheck had no claim on such funds
until all superior claims had been satisfied, including those
of Downey, a/
A mortgage foreclosure is an equitable proceeding LYI
/tern, at least until the property is sold and the proceeds of
the sale have been applied and exhausted in discharge of the
obligation to the mortgagee.
320, 145 P. 1036 (1915).

JznAtn

v. Lyicktzn^t^n,

45 Utah

Professor Powell notes:

If there is a surplus, it represents the residual value of the equity of redemption and must be disposed of accordingly. If there are no junior liens,
the owner of the equity of redemption is entitled to

is peculiar to note that although. Krofcheck claims
that the surplus was entirely his, no claims were raised against
the funds until Downey moved to amend the original Judgment and
Decree of Foreclosure in February of 1976, nearly two years
after the sale.
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the fund. If there are persons holding junior claims
against the foreclosed land who have been made parties
defendant in the action, their liens on the land are
cut off by the decree. These claims are thereby automatically transferred to the surplus moneys, which
must then be paid to such lienors in'the order of the
priority of their liens, the remainder, if any, passing
to the owner of the equity of redemption. [Emphasis
added.]
3 Powzll

on ReaX Vtioptkty,

Section 467. We would therefore

conclude that in a foreclosure proceeding

the security must

first be subjected to the claims of the Mortgagee and then, if
there is a surplus, that surplus will be| subjected to the
claims of the junior lienors.

In this ckse, only after

satisfying the claims of Downey and of tjie junior lienor
Richards & Richards would the mortgagor (Major-Blakeney) and
its successor in interest (Krofcheck) haVe any claim to the
surplus.
Appellant1 s reference to authority's/to the effect
that "the general rule is to allow attorneys1 fees against
the principal debtor [Major-Blakeney] and against the land
[>I<L&

) which is the subject of the litigation [in this case,

the fund into which the land had been converted] . . ."is
precisely in point, for this is exactly ^hat was done by Judge
Hanson below!
Indeed there is serious doubt th^t Krofcheck has any
standing to make this appeal inasmuch as I the Richards &

2/Appellantfs Brief, page 8 citing 59 C.J.S.
§ 812, p. 1555.
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"Moxtgagt*"

Richards junior lien remains unsatisfied and even if the full
sum of the surplus fund (undiminished by Downey's additional
attorneys1 fees) were applied against the lien, the lien would
remain unsatisfied.

It would appear that even if Downey's

motion to amend the original Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure
had been denied, Krofcheck would not have had any interest in
the fund since any residue would belong to Richards & Richards
as a junior lienor,

C. f* Application

80 Idaho 412, 331 P.2d 278 (1958).
78 Utah 393, 3 P.2d 267 (1931).

o£ f^Knan

Lakz

In >i<L Vzt>dltt

Village.,
IkonAixaKy Co.,

To use the phraseology of

Qz&dtKit MoJituaJiy, Krof check now appeals Judge Hanson's order
because he desires to claim the surplus funds, not because he
has any right to such funds.

CONCLUSION

By the terms of the Major-Blakeney mortgages and promissory notes, Downey State Bank was entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in the event of a default by the mortgagor.
Downey was entitled to the benefit of its bargain with the
mortgagor which means that Downey was entitled to Mbe made
whole," even in the event of an appeal.

The weight of authority

permits Downey to be reimbursed (from funds received upon the
sale of the security) for attorneys' fees incurred in resisting
an unsuccessful attack on the foreclosure decree entered below.
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The Third Judicial District Court acted within its
jurisdiction and in accordance with the Requirements of fairness and due process when it granted Dowhey's motion for an
award of additional attorneys1 fees*

The district court was

the appropriate forum for the receipt of evidence concerning
the reasonableness of the fees and for tfie resolution of conflicting claims against the surplus fundi on deposit.
Whether or not Krofcheck was a "nonassuming grantee,"
his rights to the surplus fund are not superior to those of
the mortgagor.

Krofcheck has no claim tb anything more than

the residue left after the funds from the sale of the land
are applied first in satisfaction of the mortgageef s (Downey)
claims, and then in satisfaction of the claims of the junior
lienor (Richards & Richards).

Since it would appear that

even if Judge Hanson had denied Downey's claim to deduct its
additional attorneys1 fees from the surpjLus fund, there would
still be no residue left for Krofcheck and he has no standing
to make this appeal.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 19176.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Attorney^ for the Respondent,
Downey State Bank

and By
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Appendix

"A"

DOWNEY STATE BANK v. MAJORS AKENEY CORPORATION
Utah 507
P.2d507
Cite AS 5, ment thereon is entitled to same presumption of verity as other judicial determinations. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
DOWNEY STATE BANK, Plaintiff
V.
4{f).
ft*AJOR-8LAK£N€Y C0RP0RATIOM, a
2. M«rt9a§ft* <3=440
C*f*p*rafl«ft, S—ph L. Krgfctwelt,
Though plaintiff did not exhaust all
Dtfefttfaais sm4 Apptilattt,
possible
means of finding and serving defrmmkllm D. Rtefc*rtf* a»4 CMftftfty, aa4
fendant
in mortgage foreclosure action^
Richard W. RtngwoMi, ift4£rv#£#ps»
where
defendant's
assignor had not only
No. I403U
ceased doing business in Utah but had disSupreme Court of Utah.
continued its post office box address in
Jan. 26, IS?*
California, and plaintiff had made a bona
fide attempt to serve defendant through
the
only address known to plaintiff or reaAction was instituted to foreclose upon
sonably
obtainable, requirement of rule for
two mortgages. A decree of foreclosure
publication
of summons, i. e^ exercise of
was entered upon default of defendants,
reasonable
diligence
and good faith, was
and after the Fourth District Court, Summet.
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure, rule 4(f).
mit County, J. Robert Bullock, J., denied
motion to set aside decree, defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J.,
held that plaintiff exercised reaspnable diligence and good faith so as to meet requirement of rules for publication of summons, that jurisdiction of court was not
subject to attack on grounds that summons
contained a number at variance with number given case by clerk in absence of evidence that defendant was in any way misled or adversely affected by variance in
number, that failure to give a metes and
bounds description lor property did not violate rule providing that publication of
summons shall contain a description of
subject matter or res involved in action,
and that refusal to set aside default judgment was not an abuse of discretion in
view of defendant's failure to proffer any
meritorious defense.
Affirmed.
r. J»*9fl»fit <S=M59, 162(2)
An affidavit of jurisdictional facts in
support of motion to set aside default
judgment is not sufficient if it states mere
conclusions as to diligent search and inquiry; it must set forth facts upon which
court can base a judgment as to whether
such diligence has been exercised to meet
that requirement; when this is done, judg-
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3. Trial <S=*(I)
Accuracy is always to be desired under
rule requiring that actions be assigned consecutive file numbers* but there should be
no penalty or adverse effect for mere error which causes no harm. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rules 4(c), 11,79(a).
4* Mortgaf** <5=440
Jurisdiction of court in mortgage foreclosure action was not subject to attack on
ground of alleged defects in summons as
published, albeit that summons contained a
number at variance with number given
case by clerk, where it did not appear that
defendant was in any way misled or adversely affected by variance in number.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 4(c), 11,
79(a).
5. Mertgafts <3=»448
Summons in mortgage foreclosure action met requirements of rule that publication of summons contain a description of
subject matter or res involved in action,
notwithstanding that a metes and bounds
description was not given for property
which was subject matter of action, where
a metes and bounds description would have
been of no practical use in giving notice
and, even assuming that published summons came to defendant's attention, an action thereon as so described would have

508
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given defendant just as good notice as one
which gave a metes and bounds description. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 4(c),
11,79(a).
6. Judgment <S=>145{4>
One who seeks to vacate a default
judgment must proffer some defense of at
least sufficient ostensible merit as would
justify a trial of issue thus raised.
7. JudgwMwt <S=M»
- Refusing to set aside default judgment
in mortgage foreclosure action did not con*
stitute an abuse of discretion in view of
defendant's failure to proffer any meritorious defense.
8. A w * » r a M * <S=H9(I, 3)

A party may make a special appearance to contest a court's jurisdiction over
him without submitting himself to it, but
generally, if he asks the court for affirmative relief, he thereby submits himself to
that court's jurisdiction.

Don R. Strong, Springville, for Krofcheck.
Grant Macfarlane^ of Van Cott, Bagley,
Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake City, for
Richards.
Nick J. Colessides and Carl J. Nemelka
of Nemelka & Colessides, Salt Lake City,
for Ringwood.
Scott H. Clark and George D. Helling;
Fabian & Clendeuin, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent.
CROCKETT, Justice:
Defendant Dr. Joseph L* Krofcheck, a
California resident, appeals attacking the
trial court's refusal to grant his motion to
set aside a default foreclosure on two
mortgages covering lands in Summit County. He contends: (1) that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction because (a) the
plaintiffs affidavit was insufficient to justify an order to publish summons1; and
(b) that no diligent search and inquiry was

in fact made; (2) that the summons as
published was defective, and (3) that the
motion should have been granted on equitable grounds. The land in question, part
of the Park City West ski development,
was purchased in 1967 by Major-Blakeney
Corporation, a California corporation. It
executed two mortgages as security for
payment of the purchase price. They were
later assigned to the plaintiff, Downey
State Bank, of Downey, Idaho. The mortgages were in default in May 1971 and a
one year's forbearance was granted. The
last payment of interest was made in February 1972. Several months later, in October 1973, this action to foreclose was commenced. The bank then discovered that
Major-Blakeney Corporation had ceased
doing business in Utah and that its interest
in the land had been transferred to Dr.
Krofcheck, as trustee for undisclosed California investors.
The facts as recited herein are set forth
in affidavits filed on behalf of the respective parties. In attempting to obtain services, plaintiffs attorney contacted the last
registered Utah agent of Major-Blakeney
Corporation and obtained the most recent
address of Dr. Krofcheck. The Los Angeles County deputy sheriff found that he
had moved and that the new occupant did
not know where to. Upon the basis of
these and other facts alluded to below set
forth in an affidavit, in accordance with
Rule 4<f), UJELCP., an order was obtained
for die publication of summons which was
done.
Defendants made no appearance* Upon
default, a decree of foreclosure was en*
tered March 4, 1974, and the land was sold
at sheriffs sale April 9, 1974. On October
2, 1974, a week before the six-month redemption period would expire, defendant
Krofcheck made what he characterized as
a special appearance and moved to vacate
the decree; and also to extend the redemption period for an additional six months.
The court granted the extension, which

f. Rate 4(f),
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was in effect during the time the parties
prepared and presented their documentation and arguments concerning the motions. Five months later, on March 3,*
1975, the court denied the motion to set
aside the decree and four days later vacated the order extending the redemption.
[13 Concerning the sufficiency of the
plaintiffs affidavit of jurisdictional facts:
We recognize that such an affidavit is not
sufficient if it states mere conclusions as
to diligent search and inquiry. It must set
forth facts upon which the court can base
a judgment as to whether such diligence
has been exercised to meet that
requirement* But when he has done so,
his judgment thereon is entitled to the
same presumptions of verity as other judicial determinations.*
[2] It is true that the plaintiff did not
exhaust all possibilities pointed out by the
defendant that it appears by hindsight
might have been used as a means of finding and serving him. But that is not what
is required. The requirement is that there
be exercised reasonable diligence in good
faith.4 On the basis of what has been said
above and the further facts shown to the
trial court that Dr. Krofcheck's assignor,
Major-Blakeney Corporation had ceased
doing business in Utah, had discontinued
its post office box address in California,
and that there had been a bona fide attempt to serve Dr. Krofchcck at the only
address known to or reasonably obtainable
by the plaintiff, the court was convinced
that the requirement for publication of
summons has been met. We are not persuaded to disagree with that ruling. Further facts which may be regarded as giving general color to this situation are that
nowhere in his pleadings and documents
filed in this action was a current address
given for Dr. Krofcheck, as required by
2L Liebkardt v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120 P.
215 (1911) ; Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 68,
246 P.2d 602 (1952).
3. Wmrrcth e. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416,
280 P.2d 741; Mapkeu> v. Standard ChUonite
Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 PJ2d 951.
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Rule 11, U.R.C.P.; and it is shown that a
co-defendant, Robert W. Major, had concealed his whereabouts in order to avoid
service.
[3] Defendant also attacks the jurisdiction of the court on the ground of alleged
defects in the summons as published. Due
to an error in the clerk's office, this case
was originally given the number 4473. But
it was found that this duplicated the number of a case just previously filed. To
avoid confusion, the clerk gave this case
number 4473A. But the summons as published contained that number without the
4< n
A . Defendant charges that this is in violation of Rule 79(a), U.R.C.P., which requires that "actions shall be assigned con*
secutive file numbers." No one will gainsay that accuracy is always to be desired.
But there should be no penalty or adverse
effect for mere error which causes no
harm.
[4] Insofar as giving notice to the defendants in concerned, the case number on
a summons is of little value. It is true
that the affidavit states that defendants
attorney made one inquiry about the case
numbered 4473, and was told that it did not
relate to real property. But this was after
the default judgment, during the redemption period. It does not appear that the
defendant was in any way misled or adversely affected by this variance in the
number.
[5] Defendant argues also that the summons did not meet the requirements of
Rule 4(c), U.R.GP., that " . . . publication of summons . . . shall contain a
description of the subject matter or res involved in the action." The claimed insufficiency is that the summons described the
subject matter of the action merely as pertaining to "real property located in Summit
4. See Parlcer v. Ross, 117 Utah 417, 217 P.
2d 373, particularly concurring opinion by
Justice Wolfe.
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County, Utah,'* without a metes and bounds
description.
Dae to the limited knowledge that most
people have about their real property, a
metes and bounds description would be of
Kttle practical use in giving notice. That
purpose is much better served by giving
some practical designation or description
of the property. Dr. Krofcheck would
know what real property he had any interest in located in Summit County, Utah, and
assuming the published summons came to
bis attention, an action thereon as so de'scribed would have given him just as good
notice as one which gave the metes and
bounds description.
[6,7] The other issue to be dealt with
is defendant's contention that the court
abused its discretion in refusing to set
aside the default judgment A primary
difficulty he confronts is that, as a general
proposition, one who seeks to vacate a default judgment must proffer some defense
of at least sufficient ostensible merit as
would justify a trial of the issue thus
raised.5 As the trial court appropriately
remarked on this point: the defendant
failed to proffer any meritorious defense,
or in fact any defense at all.

mons, but he combined this with the request to extend the redemption period,
which was granted and was in effect for
five months. He thus was in the anomalous position of denying that the court had
any jurisdiction to act upon his interest in
the property, but also asking the court to
protect that interest by extending the redemption period. We have not placed our
decision herein solely upon this, latter prop*
osition because we agree with the procedure adopted by the trial court; that is, of
staying the foreclosure from going forward to avoid the possibility of allowing
further difficulties to develop, until he determined the other issues as to the court's
jurisdiction and the soundness of the judgment.
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff (respondent).
HENRIOD, C J , and ELLETT,
TUCKETT and MAUGHAN. TI^ concur.

£8] In conjunction with what has been
said herein, there is another matter lurking
hi the background in this case which,
though we do not regard as of controlling
importance, tends to support our conclusion
that .the trial court did not abuse his discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment A party may make a special appearance to contest a court's jurisdiction over
him without submitting himself to i t But
generally, if he asks the court for affirmative relief, he thereby submits himself to
that court's jurisdiction.* Here the defendant not only made the attacks hereinabove discussed upon the -service of sum5b \T« sot state in awareness that this may not
Judgments § 338; 118 A.LJL 1408; Moore's
be- true if the attack is predicated solely oa
Federal Practice par. 55.10(1).
the ground that the court was entirely with*
out jurisdiction. See Atkinso* v. Atkinson^ fc See Rick* v. Wo4*. ** Utah 402, 93 P.2d
43 Utah 53, 134 P. 595; Peterson v. Crosier,
479; S wet nam v. Daily, 95 Utah 74, 79
29 Utah 235, 81 P. 860; and cfc: 49 OJ.3.
P<2d 20; 111 AJLJt 925.
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I1 Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DOWNEY STATE BANK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MAJOR-BolAKENEY CORPORATION,

et a l . ,

ORDER
Defendant,
Civil No. 4473-A

JOSEPH L. KROFCHECK,
Defendant,
and
FRANKLIN D. RICHARDS &
COMPANY, and RICHARD W.
RINGWOOD,
Intervenors.

This matter came before this Court upon the Plaintiff's
Motion to Amend Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure Nunc Pro Tunc
and upon a hearing of Plaintiff's Motion on Monday, March 15, 1976
in the Summit County Courthouse, Coalville, Utah before the
Honorable Stewart M. Hansen, Sr.
Due notice of the said hearing was given to all parties
and to their counsel of record. Scott H. Clark of Fabian &
Clendenin, appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. No other parties
or their counsel were present.
This Court received and considered the "Memorandum of
Points and Authorities" filed March 15, 1976 by Don R. Strong,
counsel for Joseph Krofcheck, one of the defendants, wherein
Mr. Strong declined to make an appearance before this Court at
the said hearing. A copy of the "Memorandum of Points and

Appendix n B w
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I

Authorities" was made available to plaintiff's counsel by the
Court, a copy not previously having been made available to
plaintiff's counsel.
This Court received evidende in the form of sworn
testimony concerning the attorneys' fees and expenses incurred
J by the plaintiff in the prosecution of the instant mortgage
foreclosure proceeding (subsequent to the entry of the original
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure on March 4, 19 74) as a result
of the defendant's ex parte motion to extend the statutory
redemption period, of defendant's motion to vacate the said
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, and of defendant's unsuccessful appeal of the denial of defendant's motion to vacate, which
evidence indicated the additional expenditure by the plaintiff,
in connection with the instant mortgage foreclosure proceeding, of
the sum of $5,421.9 8 plus the costs and attorneys' fees incurred
in connection with this motion of $200.00 or a total of an.
additional $5,621.98 in attorneys' fees and expenses.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment and
Decree of Foreclosure Nunc Pro Tunc is hereby granted and it is
HEREBY ORDERED that in the interest of justice and according to
Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Judgment
and Decree of Foreclosure of March 4, 19 74 be and hereby is
amended, nunc pro tunc, awarding plaintiff the additional sum of
$5,621.98 as attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in connection
with this foreclosure proceeding.
It is hereby further ordered that the Clerk of this
Court disburse unto the plaintiff from among the excess funds now
on deposit with this Court pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-37-41 as a
result of the Sheriff's Sale conducted April 9, 1974, the sum of
$5,621.9 8 in satisfaction of plaintiff's claims for these
additional attorneys' fees and expenses.
DATED this

/ 7 3ay of March/ 1976.

Stewart M. Hansen, Sr.
Senior Judge
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